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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 14-4801 
 ___________ 
 
STEPHEN BENSON, 
   Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY COORDINATOR 
CENTRAL OFFICE; ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY COORDINATOR NORTHEAST 
REGIONAL OFFICE, Chief and Regional Counsel; WARDEN J.T. SHARTLE; MR. 
POTTER, Disciplinary Hearing Officer; MS. K. CONCEPTION, Education Teacher; 
MR. GINDVILLE, Unit-Manager, A Unit; MS. N. MORI, Case Manager; MS. SMITH, 
Case Manager, A Unit; COUNSELOR LOMBARDI, A-Unit; ADMINISTRATIVE 
REMEDY COORDINATOR; ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT FCI FAIRTON 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.N.J. Civ. No. 1-13-cv-00213) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Renée M. Bumb
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6  
August 20, 2015 
 
 Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: August 25, 2015) 
 _________ 
 
OPINION* 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
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_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Stephen Benson, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from orders of the  
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing his petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in which he sought relief from 
sanctions imposed in prison disciplinary proceedings.  We will summarily affirm. 
 On February 25, 2012, Officer Concepcion was in the library at FCI Fairton when 
she noticed that Benson, who was seated at another table, was staring at her.  She soon 
realized that Benson was masturbating because his pants were pulled down “lower than 
appropriate,” his penis was out, and he was massaging it.  She ordered him to stop and 
had him removed from the library.  The incident resulted in Benson being charged with a 
prohibited act, i.e., “[e]ngaging in sexual acts.”  28 C.F.R. § 541.3, Table 1, Code 205. 
 A disciplinary hearing was held on March 8, 2012.  Benson was advised of his 
rights and waived the services of a staff representative.  He denied the charge, stating that 
he had psoriasis over most of his body and had his hands in his pants because he was 
scratching himself.  Benson requested that the inmates who were sitting at the library 
table with him be called as defense witnesses, as well as Dr. Morales, who he claimed 
would testify about the extent of his psoriasis.  The inmates were not called because 
Benson could not identify them and could only indicate that they were Jamaican.  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
not constitute binding precedent. 
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Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”) did not call the doctor because he accepted as 
undisputed that Benson had psoriasis over a large portion of his body. 
 The DHO found that Benson had engaged in sexual acts in violation of Code 205 
by “exposing and rubbing [his] penis in view of staff,” relying on the eyewitness account 
of Officer Concepcion and Benson’s partial admission that he had his hands in his pants.  
The DHO gave little weight to Benson’s defense that he was merely scratching himself 
because it did not account for the fact that Officer Concepcion observed his exposed 
penis.  The DHO also found Benson’s account unbelievable, concluding that a person 
who had an itch of the “nature and degree” Benson allegedly had would have gone to a 
restroom to address the issue.  Sanctions were imposed, including the loss of 27 days of 
good conduct time. 
 After pursuing administrative remedies, Benson filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that his due process rights were violated 
during the disciplinary proceedings.  The District Court dismissed all but one of his 
claims with prejudice.  However, the court granted Benson leave to “amend and clarify” a 
claim regarding the denial of the unidentified inmates as witnesses.  Benson subsequently 
submitted a letter to the court regarding that claim.  After considering Benson’s letter, the 
District Court dismissed the claim.  Benson then filed this appeal, but he has not filed any 
argument in support of it. 
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 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1  We review the District 
Court’s denial of habeas relief de novo and its factual findings for clear error.  Denny v. 
Schultz, 708 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2013).  If no substantial question is presented, we 
may affirm on any ground supported by the record.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6; 
Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 A prisoner has a liberty interest in good conduct credit.  Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 
U.S. 539, 557 (1974).  Thus, a disciplinary hearing that may result in the loss of such 
credit must provide certain due process safeguards to a prisoner, including:  (1) at least 
24-hour advance notice of the charges; (2) an opportunity to call witnesses and present 
documentary evidence; and (3) a written decision explaining the evidence relied upon and 
the reasons for the disciplinary action.  Id. at 564-66.  The Supreme Court has held that 
“revocation of good time does not comport with the minimum requirements of procedural 
due process unless the findings of the prison disciplinary board are supported by some 
evidence in the record.”  Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  This standard is minimal and “does not require 
examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, 
or weighing of the evidence.”  Id. at 455.  Rather, the relevant inquiry “is whether there is 
any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary 
                                                 
1 Benson’s challenge to a disciplinary action resulting in the loss of good conduct 
time is properly brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  Queen v. Miner, 530 F.3d 253, 
254 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008).  A certificate of appealability is not required to appeal from the 
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board.”  Id., at 455-56. 
 Here, the DHO’s finding that Benson engaged in sexual acts in violation of Code 
205 by “exposing and rubbing [his] penis in view of staff” was supported by “some 
evidence.”  The DHO relied upon the incident report filed by Officer Concepcion, in 
which she stated that she observed Benson with his pants pulled down, massaging his 
exposed penis.  The “some evidence” standard may be satisfied solely by such an 
incident report.  See Hudson v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 534, 536-37 (5th Cir. 2001); 
McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999).  In this case, however, the  
DHO also relied on Benson’s partial admission that he had his hands in his pants.  
Accordingly, the decision was supported by sufficient evidence to comply with the 
requirements of procedural due process.2 
                                                                                                                                                             
denial of a § 2241 petition.  See Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2009).  
2 Although the District Court determined that the incident report and Benson’s 
admission constituted “some evidence,” it went further to conclude – relying on 
Pachtinger v. Grondolsky, 340 F. App’x 774 (3d Cir. 2009) – that Benson need not have 
engaged in a sexual act to have violated Code 205, but only to have “engaged in activity 
that could have been perceived as a sexual act.”  Op. at 9, Benson v. United States, No. 
13-0213, (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2014), ECF No. 3.  We disagree, and find the District Court’s 
reliance on Pachtinger misplaced.  Pachtinger was not found to have violated Code 205, 
but rather Code 299, which prohibits “[c]onduct which disrupts or interferes with the 
security or orderly running of the institution . . . most like another [h]igh severity 
prohibited act.”  28 C.F.R. § 541.3, Table 1, Code 299.  In Pachtinger, the conduct was 
found to be “most like” engaging in a sexual act.  340 F. App’x at 776.  The following 
passage from that decision merely reflects the nature of the findings in that case, and is 
not a holding regarding what constitutes a violation of Code 205:  “Pachtinger was not 
found to have engaged in a sexual act; rather, he was found to have engaged in activity 
that could have been perceived as a sexual act and which was disruptive to the orderly 
running of the institution.”  Id. at 776-77.  In sharp contrast, Benson was found to have 
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 Benson’s assertion that his rights were violated because the DHO considered the 
incident report to be more credible than his defense does not disturb our conclusion.  A 
challenge to the weight accorded evidence is not relevant to the question of whether the 
decision was supported by “some evidence” because the standard does not require 
“weighing of the evidence.”  Hill, 472 U.S. at 455.  Furthermore, we note that the DHO’s 
decision complied with the requirement that a decision must be based on the “greater 
weight of the evidence” when conflicting evidence is presented.  28 C.F.R. § 541.8(f).  
The written decision reflects that the conflicting evidence was considered, but that the 
DHO found the greater weight of the evidence to indicate that Benson had violated Code 
205. 
 We agree with the District Court that Benson’s due process right to present 
witnesses was not violated by the DHO’s refusal to call Dr. Morales and the unidentified 
inmates.  Benson wanted Dr. Morales to testify that Benson had psoriasis over a large 
portion of his body.  This testimony was not necessary because the DHO accepted that 
fact as undisputed.  As for the three inmates seated with Benson in the library at the time 
of the incident, Benson could not identify them, thus the DHO could not call them.  
Benson has not presented any legal basis, nor do we find any, that the DHO was required 
to determine the identity of these witnesses for Benson. 
                                                                                                                                                             
violated Code 205 by “exposing and rubbing [his] penis in view of staff.”  Thus, that 
finding had to have been supported by “some evidence” of such conduct.  It could not 
have been sustained merely by Benson’s concession that he was scratching his unexposed 
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 As for Benson’s related claim that his rights were violated by the refusal to 
provide the “30 Inmate Out-Count Sheet,” we note that it remains somewhat vague.  
Benson claimed that he could have tried to determine the identity of the three inmates if 
he had been able to see “30 Inmate Out-Count Sheet” because he knew their first names.  
This conflicts somewhat with the DHO’s report, which notes that “Benson stated he did 
not know the identity of the inmates at the table with him, but indicated they were 
Jamaican.”  When responding to the District Court’s order, Benson alleged that the DHO 
“took it upon himself to fabricate [the unidentified witnesses] as Jamaican.”  Moreover, 
Benson never revealed the first names of the witnesses, so his claim that he could have 
identified the inmates remains general and conclusory.  In any event, Benson told the 
District Court that “the difference the witnesses would have made remains a mistry [sic],” 
but that they would nonetheless have testified that Benson was not facing Officer 
Concepcion in the library and therefore her assumptions about what he was doing were 
incorrect.  This appears to be nothing more than an unsupported attempt to refute Officer 
Concepcion’s eyewitness account.  The vagueness of Benson’s claim, coupled with the 
self-serving speculation about the unidentified witnesses’ testimony, is insufficient to 
establish that he was prejudiced by the failure to call the witnesses or that his due process 
rights were violated. 
 Benson’s remaining claims also lack merit.  He asserted that the DHO was biased 
                                                                                                                                                             
penis, as the District Court theorized.  
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against him and inclined to accept Officer Concepcion’s account of events over his own 
because the DHO worked with her.  This claim of general bias does not indicate the type 
of “direct personal or otherwise substantial involvement . . .  in the circumstances 
underlying the charge” that shows, or would lead us to question, the DHO’s impartiality.  
Meyers v. Alldredge, 492 F.2d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1974).  To the extent Benson alleged 
that the DHO’s report was untimely, we note that there is no regulatory requirement 
regarding the deadline for completion and delivery of such reports.  Furthermore, the 
report was delivered to Benson about a month after the hearing, and he has failed to 
explain how that prejudiced him or constituted a violation of his rights.  Although Benson 
complained extensively about the administrative remedies process at FCI Fairton, these 
complaints are of no moment because he has received judicial review of the merits of all 
of his claims. 
 Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s orders.  See 3d Cir. 
L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
  
